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by Amanda Bartley 
 
In Plato’s Meno, Meno 
asks Socrates if virtue can be 
taught. Socrates responds that to 
know if virtue can be taught or 
not, one must first know what 
virtue is. Meno responds, “He 
cannot search for what he knows 
– since he knows it, there is no 
need to search – nor for what he 
does not know, for he does not 
know what to look for.”  Meno's 
question is one of epistemology. 
Epistemology is the theory of 
knowledge: what knowledge is, 
how we get it, what we can or 
cannot know, or if we really have 
knowledge to begin with.  In 
Meno’s case, it is the question of 
how we are able to transmit the 
knowledge of virtue from one 
person to another. Socrates 
realizes that Meno’s very 
question makes a significant 
assumption: that he knows what 
virtue is in the first place. This is 
a question of metaphysics.  
Metaphysics studies the 
nature and principles of being, or 
reality.  When he engages in 
metaphysics, Socrates engages in 
the study of “what is”.  He insists 
that one must know virtue in the 
metaphysical sense before one 
can ask any questions about it.  
The metaphysical and  
 
 
epistemological questions posed 
by Meno and Socrates tend to  
blend together, partly due to the 
fact that neither of these 
categories – epistemology and 
metaphysics – has been created 
at this point. This blending is also 
due to the fact that every 
metaphysical question tends to 
have epistemological assumptions 
hidden in it and vice versa.  
To Socrates (and by 
extension Plato), the first 
question to be asked is that of 
metaphysics, “What is virtue?” 
The epistemological aspect does 
not arise: that we have the 
capability to know and 
understand virtue is self- evident 
to Socrates. Today this is not so.  
Descartes’ Discourse on the 
Method started what today we 
call the “epistemological turn” in 
philosophy. Since Descartes, the 
primary questions of philosophy 
have been epistemological in 
nature, not metaphysical, as they 
had been in the past, for the 
Discourse focuses not on what we 
know, but how we know.  It is 
thus a forerunner of the scientific 
method.  Science itself, though it 
seeks to tell us about reality and 
its laws, is an epistemological 
discipline.  That is, science first 
affirms that the scientific method 
is how we know, so that it can 
then tell us what we know.       
But is the Cartesian-
scientific approach correct?  
Should we start with 
epistemology, or should we 
oppose this method and begin 




with epistemology we may arrive 
at the conclusion of what we may  
or may not know, but is this the 
pursuit of truth or the pursuit of 
something else? By restricting 
our range of knowledge we may 
cut out the possibility of knowing 
ultimate truth. If we are 
incapable of knowing ultimate 
truth, it is pointless to continue to 
search for it regardless if it exists 
or not.  Thus the only truths we 
can come to know are the little 
truths that we are capable of, the 
“truths” of a given epistemology. 
If, however, we start with the 
metaphysical question, then by 
not knowing what we are capable 
or incapable of knowing we may 
be pursuing an unattainable goal.  
From the pragmatic (and also 
today’s commonsense 
“scientific”) view the obvious 
choice would be to choose 
epistemology. At least then, most 
people would say, we would know 
something, even if it is the 
negative knowledge of what we 
can’t know. Perhaps, but by 
pursuing this course we have 
done so at the expense of any 
philosophy in the true Socratic 
sense. Seems as though Meno has 
won after all. 
 
When searching for 
knowledge about reality, should 
we first ask the epistemological 
question of knowledge, or the 
metaphysical question about 
“being in general?” We will 
discuss this question at our next 
meeting. The question should be 
particularly interesting for those 
with an inclination towards 
science, as science is the dominate 
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force in modern times that 
investigates reality. Should 
science re-think its starting point, 
or is it even possible for it to do 
so? Finally, what truths do we get 
from such observations of 
reality? Does science give us 
“ultimate truth”, or the little 
truths of its particular discipline?  
 
Please join the PDG on 
Monday, February 17, at 7:00 
p.m. for our profound reflections 
on this metaphysico-
epistemologico-presuppositional 
discussion.  We will meet in the 
Honor's Lounge on the second 





by Ernst Virklick 
 
  Instead of permitting me 
to write the lead article, which is 
what he should have done, Eric 
informed me a week ago that 
Amanda Bartley was writing an 
essay for the acclaimed 
Philosopher’s Stone  on a topic 
dear to my heart, or at least on a 
topic near to the topic dear to my 
heart.  I believe – as I have not 
yet seen her article – that Bartley 
is writing on whether 
epistemology should precede 
ontology, or whether ontology 
should precede epistemology in 
philosophical inquiry.  I would 
like, however, to write about the 
half-witted haughtiness of 
scientists who think that science 
is purely epistemological, or, to 
bring my polemic closer to 
Bartley’s topic, on the 
thoughtlessness of those who 
maintain that science does not 
involve an ontological 
perspective, and thus begins with 
epistemology.    
I was recently at a 
conference in which an 
overconfident scientist argued for 
the epistemological purity of 
science, that is, that science 
attempts only to provide an 
epistemological method for 
looking at and manipulating the 
world and, therefore, assumes no 
ontology, which he proceeded to 
condemn as “a blind groping in 
the dark.”  Aside from his 
assertion about the absence of 
ontology in science and his 
startlingly unoriginal metaphor, 
this analytical monster had 
nothing to say about ontology.  
His assertion, however, reveals 
his base foolishness, a trait of 
which many scientists partake.   
For science – this 
epistemological discipline – 
assumes an ontological 
perspective without which 
science and the scientific method 
fail to have meaning.  The 
scientific method is based on the 
repeatability of experiments.  It 
proves the “reality” of gravity by 
the repetition of experiments that 
confirm past experiments: so 
long as the ball drops down to the 
ground instead of soaring into 
the air, gravity is assumed to be 
actual.  But is it not evident to 
scientists that this method of 
proof assumes an ontological 
belief, namely that the future will 
be like the past, that nature is 
uniform?  The scientific belief 
that generalizations about the 
future can be made on the basis 
of past experiments presupposes 
that reality is uniform, or 
regular, and this presupposition, 
without which science could not 
logically function, though it 
could, and does, illogically 
function – this presupposition is 
ontological in character. 
Moreover, scientific fops 
also fail to notice that scientific 
procedure involves the 
conjunction of observation and 
mathematics.  That is, the 
scientist compiles a table of data, 
then looks for a pattern in her 
data that she can represent by 
means of a formula.  The 
problem with this procedure is 
that it relies on mathematics, 
which by nature deals with static 
entities, to describe a dynamic 
world.  Thus, in order for 
scientific procedure to work 
logically, the scientist must 
assume that reality is not a 
continuous flow or process, but a 
succession of physical or 
energical events, or that reality is 
a succession of fragmented 
moments in time.  I have not the 
fragments of time, or space, to 
point out the problem to which 
this perspective on reality entails; 
my task is gently to remind 
scientists that this perspective on 
reality is an ontology, that science 







                    
        
 
                                       
      
                          
   
         
                                     
                  
 
If you have any questions, 
criticisms, or comments, 
please contact either Eric 
Verhine or Dr. Nordenhaug.  
Anyone interested in 
writing a brief article for 
The Philosopher’s Stone, 
please contact either of us.        
 




Dr. Erik Nordenhaug, 
Faculty Advisor 
nordener@mail.armstrong.e
du 
 
